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Droft Recommendation
on European capabilities in thefield of strdegic mobility
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that strategic mobility presupposes the capability for coherent deployment of troops
and logistic support and for bringrng them back;
(i, Recalling that WEU, when the moment arrives, must be prepared to undertake the tasks laid
down in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992;
(iii) Noting that strategic mobility capability is obviously a primary requirement for carrying out
those tasks;
(iv) Considering that to have such capability both the necessary transport means and logistic support
and a command structure 
- 
in other words an operation command and control system capable of prepar-
ing, coordinating and controlling such operations 
- 
are essential;
(v) Underlining that the first, essential condition for a strategic mobility capability is a system of
command and control over operations for preparing plans, issuing orders, transmitting them, launching
operations, controlling and achieving them;
(v) Pointing out that advance planning is therefore necessary, supported by a suitable information
system so that a "library" can thus be created of possible intervention sites, based on overall, ongoing,
continuously updated assessments of what is happening in those areas where Europe might intervene at
some point;
(vii) Noting that once the appropriate information is available, action plans then have to be drawn up
which must logically be based on coordination and cooperation between allies, since operations will be
carried out using the joint military me:ms of several countries;
(viii) Highlighting the fact that it is clear that countries' military capability for forces projection by
land, sea and air must be sufficient in all respects for carrying out WEU missions;
(ix) Welcoming the fact that the German Presidency has decided to conduct an audit of transport
assets available for European operations:
(x) Considering that the deficiencies in military transport make it necessary to have recourse to
civilian transport means,
(xi) Noting that this situation is leading individual countries to draw up internal agreements on the
use ofnational civilian transport assets;
(xit) Recognising in this connection tle agreements reached between the Council and Ukraine, and
the negotiations with Russi4 regarding the use of those countries' air transport assets by WEU nations;
(rii, Considering nevertheless that Ukraine or Russia would invariably hold the key to such coopera-
tive ventures getting offthe ground;
(xi, Persuaded that the progranrme for large-capacity air transport involving several European
nations wishing to acquire strategic lift is of paramount interest as it falls entirely within the framework
of a common industrial defence policy;
(xv) Stressing in consequence that strategic mobility goes hand in hand with equipment standard-
isation and interoperability;
(xvt) Welcoming the excellent work done by the relevant working groups on WEU's strategic mobil-
ity and joint logistic support concepts;
(xvii) Noting that the document entitled 'oEuropean Security: a common concept of the 27 WEIJ
countries" adopted in Madrid in Novernber 1995 drew atteirtion to the existence of a gap in terms of
DOCUMENT 1644
strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities and countries concluded that there was a need to have
transport capabilifies available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the
theatre ofoperation as required;
(rvii, Notrng finally that the WEU Mobility Working Group has been tasked with studying the pos-
sible acquisition of strategic transport assets and ways of improving cooperation in the field of in-
theatre mobility,
RECOMMENDS THAT TTM COI.JNCIL
l. Consider the creation within WEU of the permanent structures necessary for acquiring a real
strategic mobility capability 
- 
specifically a system of operational command and control (CIS) and lo-
gistics structures;
2. Urge those WEU countries that have not already done so to conclude internal agreements that
enable them to draw on national civilian means of overland, sea or air transport, as necessary, for
Petersberg operations:
3. Undertake a study at European level on the possible use of reseryes, should the need arise, when
making use of such civilian assets;
4. Speed up as much as possible and inform the Assembly immediately of the results of the Mobility
Working Group's study on possible acquisition of strategic transport assets and on ways of improving
cooperation in the field of in-theatre mobility:
5. Support and give more active encouragement to Airbus Military's A400M European military
transport progrimrme, the successor to the earlier FLA (future large aircraft) programme;
6. Take good account of the fact that any decision to be taken by the nations and WEU regarding
the European military transport aircraft will be exceptionally far-reaching from a military, political and
industrial point of vielv.
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Explan atory M emoran dum
(submitted by Mr Ldpez Henares, Rupporteur)
I. Introduction
1. WEU, as we know, at present has no
forces or permanent command structures. How-
ever, when faced with a crisis, the Council may,
at the request of one or more member countries
or of the European Union, decide to establish
such forces as are necessary for the conduct of a
given operation. To that end, any WEU country,
irrespective of its status, may make whatever
contribution it regards as appropriate for carr),-
ing out a WEU mission. WEU may furthermore
have recourse to joint multinational forces made
available to it in the event of crisis.
2. Part II of the Council of Ministers' Peters-
berg Declaration of 19 June 1992- on strengthen-
ing WEU's operational role, states that:
"2. WEU member states declare that they
are prepared to make available military
units from the whole spectrum of their
conventional armed forces for military
tasks conducted under the authority of
WEU.
3. Decisions to use military units an-
swerable to WEU will be taken by the
WEU Council. Participation in specific
operations will remain a sovereign deci-
sion of member states in accordance with
national constitutions.
4. Apart from contributing to the com-
mon defence in accordance with Article 5
of the Washington Treaty and Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
peacekeeping tasks;
tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making.
()
6. Military units will be drawn from the
forces of WEU member states, including
forces with NATO missions 
- 
in this case
after consultation with NATO 
- 
and will
be organised on a multinational and multi-
service basis.
7. All WEU member states will soon
designate which of their military units and
headquarters they would be willing to
make available to WEU for its various
possible tasks. Where multinational for-
mations drawn from the forces of WEU
nations already exist or are planned, these
units could be made available for use un-
der the authority of WEU, with agreement
of all participating nations.
8. WEU member states intend to de-
velop and exercise the appropriate capa-
bilities to enable the deployment of WEU
military units by land, sea or air to ac-
complish these tasks."
3. In this connection, a workshop on crisis
management was held on l0 September 1998 at
NATO headquarters. The aims were threefold: to
develop and validate NATO-\MEU consultation
procedures in the event of a WEU-led operation
using NATO military assets and capabilities, to
familiarise the North Atlantic and WEU Councils
with the procedures developed for such consult-
ations and to serve as a building-block for a joint
NATO-WEU crisis-management exercise in the
year 2000.
4. In 1998 also,24 countries belonging to the
Organisation were involved in the WEU crisis
exercise, Crisex 98, to which representatives
from NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the United
Nations were invited as observers. The aim of the
exercise was to practise the first phases of WEU
crisis-management mechanisms and procedures.
Pre- and post-exercise briefings were given to
Russia, Ukraine and non-WEU Mediterranean
countries.
5. The Organisation. as will become clear in
a later chapter, has produced a series of studies
on strategic mobility from a strictly military per-
spective. Your Rapporteur, feels there is a need
to examine precisely what strategic mobility
consists of and whether WEU has both the neces-
sary studies and resources at its disposal to de-
ploy it and if not. most importantly, whether it
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has the necessary political will to acquire such
capability and to use it effectively when the time
comes.
II. Strategic mobility
6. Strategic mobility is a wider and more
complicated concept than the mere projection of
forces. According to the strategic mobility con-
cept drawn up by WEU, to which we shall refer
at length in due course, strategic mobility is the
capability to move forces and their associated
logistic support in a timely and effective manner
over continental and intercontinental distances.
To acquire that capability it is essential to have
appropriate intelligence, the necessary transport
means and logistic support and a command
strucfure, in other words an operation command
and control system capable ofpreparing, coordi-
nating and controlling such operations.
7. The first, essential condition for a strategic
mobility capability is a system of command and
control over operations for preparing plans. issu-
ing orders, transmitting them, launching opera-
tions, controlling and achieving them. Hence ad-
vance planning is necessary, supported by a suit-
able information system. A "library" could thus
be created ofpossible intervention sites, based on
overall, ongoing, continuously updated assess-
ments of what is happening in those areas where
Europe might intervene at some point. Such pot-
ential flashpoints are easily identifiable.
8. Once the appropriate information is avail-
able, action plans then have to be drawn up
which must logically be based on coordination
and cooperation between allies, since operations
must necessarily be carried out using the joint
military means of several countries.
9. The factors to be taken into account are
many and the solutions not always obvious. One
important aspect is forces projection, since the
means of projection will vary depending on the
magnitude of the conflict, conditions in the
theatre into which the forces are to be projected
and the distances involved. If light equipment is
to be used, airlift will be the preferred means of
projection, whereas if heavy equipment is re-
quired, overland or maritime means will be used.
10. However, although forces projection is an
important consideration, there are other, equally
crucial factors involved, one of them being logis-
tics. There can be no strategic mobility without
logistics, in other words without the guarantee
that all the projected forces' battlefield supply
needs 
- 
from munitions to hospitals 
- 
can be met.
Strategic mobility therefore presupposes a cap-
ability for coherent deployment of troops and
logistic support and, lvhen the time comes, for
bringing them back.
I 1. Another basic consideration is lvhether
WEU should have its own essential, and hence
permanent, structures for strategic mobility, for
example a command and control system for op-
erations, since a permanent form of organisation
implies a habit of working together and exercis-
ing jointly on a regular basis.
12. It is suggested that our own Organisation,
WEU, be able to draw on NATO structures. This
is a perfectly valid option, but if it is the one cho-
sen, strategic mobility can never be a wholly
European asset. In point of fact, WEU's Military
Committee would logically be no more than the
first stage in a process leading to the creation of
structures similar to those of the Atlantic Alli-
ance. WEU logistical structures must clearly
therefore be permanent.
III. The WEU Council's work
in the area of strutegic mobility
13. The WEU Council decided on 7 April
1993 to carry out a study on European strategic
mobility requirements, as a follow-up to a pre-
liminary examination of the subject undertaken
by the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) a
short time before.
14. The aims of the WEU study, which was
based on a Franco-Gernan study in the same
field, were to evaluate WEU requirements in
terms of strategic mobility and develop a concept
of strategic mobility for the Organisation, which
would be compatible with and complementary to
that of NATO.
15. This final section of the study, "Strategic
Mobility Concept for the WE[J", was developed
in cooperation with NATO's advisory group on
the management of movements, transport and
mobility.
16. On I January 1994,inaccordancewiththe
decision taken on 24 May 1993 by Eurogroup
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ministers to transfer Eurolog to WEU, the WEU
Logisics Group (WELG) was formally created.
Its tasks involved:
"producing a booklet containing L
concise checklist ofkey logistic consid-
erations for any nation about to take
part in United Nations peacekeeping
operations;
the development of a containerised
support concept, and a review of suit-
able operational logistics management
information systems for use in a WEU
context (maritime operations);
the development of the logistics re-
quirement and a framework for WEU
ground forces logistics systems in 2000
and beyond (ground-based operations);
the development of a mobility hand-
book for potential WEU operations,
and work to update the mutual emer-
gency supply and support system (air-
based operations)."
17. [n October 1995, WELG examined the
framework document on WEU ground logistics
forces systems drafted by the Planning Cell. The
same month the Council approved the mandate of
the WEU Strategic Mobility Working Group
(WSMWG) chaired by the Planning Cell and
composed of national experts on movements and
transport. The WSMWG was tasked with defin-
ing a WEU strategic mobility concept.
18. The logistics issue rvas also addressed at
the WEU ministerial meeting in Madrid on 14
November 1995 where the document "European
security: a common concept of the 27 WEU
countries"r was adopted. Here the WEU states
noted existing deficiencies in terms of strategic
and in-theatre transport capabilities and con-
cluded that there w:N a need to have transport
capabilities available permitting the rapid pro-
jection of forces and t}reir deployment to the
theatre ofoperation as required.
19. The document underlined the fact that in
this field, Europeans must currently call upon
other countries or the international market for
heavy airlift. To solve the problem, WEU states
proposed an "examination of the requirements
for, and means of generating, strategic lift for the
various types of operations envisaged and that
thought should be given to the question of mili-
tary transport aircraft ".
20. In April 1996, the Chiefs of Defence
Staffs (CHODs) endorsed a WEU strategic mo-
bility concep designed to facilitate Petersberg
missions. On 3l October of that year, they gave
their formal approval to this concept which was
then adopted by the Permanent Council on 30
April 1997.
21. As a result, the WEU Mobilrty Working
Group (WMWG) was tasked with follow-on
studies on the possible acquisition of military
strategic transport assets and on ways of improv-
ing cooperation in the field of in-theatre mobility.
ln 1997, the Planning Cell prepared a draft
document on a joint logistics support doctrine for
WEU and drafted a report which analysed pos-
sibilities of cooperation with Russia and Ukraine
in the deld of long-haul air transport.
22. On 30 June 1997. in Brussels, WEU
signed a cooperation agreement with [Jkraine, on
the provision oflong-haul air transport assets in
support of Petersberg missions, with a view to
strengthening WEU's operational potential and
the projection capabilities of forces answerable to
wEU (FAWEU).
23. According to the WEU press release is-
sued on that occasion, Ukraine was prepared to
facilitate the provision of long-haul air transport
assets to the WEU nations, giving it priority over
other requests, in support of Petersberg missions,
including training and exercises. organised under
WEU authority. Such cooperation would concern
Ilyushin 76 MD aircraft, although the list might
be extended by mutual agreement to other types
of aircraft, such as the Antonov.
24. Based on this document, WEU countries
will be able to finalise bilateral agreements with
Ukraine. WEU has also started negotiations with
Russia on the provision of similar assets.
25. The second part of the forty-fourttr annual
report of the Council to the Assernbly states that
some WEU countries are already engaged in bi-
lateral negotiations with Llkraine over :urange-
ments for obtaining strategic lift assets.I Assembly Document l4g3,20 November 1995.
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26. A project on long-haul strategic lift, simi-
lar to that lvith Ukraine, is also underway with
the Russian Federation. Again, the forty-fourth
annual report states that WEU has agreed pro-
posals from Russia relating to the terminology to
be used ("Large capacity air transport" instead
of "long-haul air transport"), the deletion of the
state of readiness (initially set up for 72 hours)
and finally the insertion of "insurance" in the
financial terms of the draft agreement.
27. Finally- on l8 November 1997, the WEU
Council approved "A joint logistic support con-
cept for the Western European Union". This
document, together with the document entitled
"Strategic Mobility Concept for the WEU"
would appear to be of particular interest in terms
of a better understanding of the present report
and we shall therefore consider them briefly be-
low.
"A Strotegic Mobility Conceptfor the WU"
28. This document addresses:
the factors affecting movernent and
transportation support (M&T), in par-
ticular the very limited availability of
strategic ffansportation resources:
the definition of M&T principles and
policies;
the structures, responsibilities, tasks
and procedures, which define the WEU
strategic mobility concept.
29. Strategic mobility is defined as "the cap-
ability to move forces and their associated lo-
gistic support in a timely and effective manner
over continental and intercontinental distances".
The terms movement and transportation can be
defined as follows:
"Movement is the activity involved in
the change in location of equipment,
personnel or stocks as part of a military
operation. Movement requires the sup-
porting capabilities of mobility, trans-
portation, infrastructure, movement
control and support functions".
"Transportation is the means of con-
veyance to move forces, equipment,
personnel and stocks and includes the
requisite materials-handling equip-
ment."
30. The study then establishes a classification
of the factors affecting WEU strategic mobility.
General factors include the fact that WEU op-
erations may occur anywhere in the world, that
not necessarily all member nations lvill provide
forces for a particular operation, that there is a
relatively low degree of equipment standardis-
ation and that, by definition, all WEU operations
will be "combined".
31. Secondly, tlere are factors arising from
WEU's way of operating; these include the ad
hoc nature of WEU operations, the fact that there
are no command strucfures"permanently under
the authority of WEU and the process leading to
the creation ofWEU forces.
32. Thirdly, there are the factors influencing
movement and transportation. These are as fol-
lows: limited availability of military transporta-
tion assets for strategic movement in WEU na-
tions; the fact that civil movement and transpor-
tation resources may be necessary to meet stra-
tegic movement requirements; the abilrty of na-
tions to acquire civilian transportation assets in
support of WEU operations; compliance lvith
existing military and civil regulations of host na-
tions concerning transportation, chartering, use
ofports, transportation of dangerous goods and
possible competition for the use of civil M&T
resources.
33. A section of the paper is devoted to WEU
strategic mobility principles. The following main
principles apply to movement and transportation
support of WEU forces. National and WEU
authorities, i.e. the Council, the Operation Com-
mander and the Force Commander, share a col-
lective responsibility for M&T support to WEU
operations.
34. Specific responsibilities include, firstly,
nations' responsibility: the sending nation is re-
sponsible for obtaining transportation resources
to deploy, sustain and redeploy its forces and
also for planning and controlling the movement
ofnational forces and the national component of
the multinational forces. This principle must be
tempered by the need for cooperation, coordina-
tion and economy, and the fact that the host na-
tion has the ultimate authority to approve move-
ment and transportafion on sovereign territory.
35. WEU responsibility is as follows: WEU
authorities are responsible for initiating, prioritis-
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ing, coordinating and deconflicting the deploy-
ment, resupply and redeployment of the WEU
force. Lastly, lead nation responsibility consists
in the lead nations appointed by the WEU
Council or by constituent nations being respons-
ible for the deployment of the multinational head-
quarters group.
36. Other principles governing WEU strategic
mobility are cooperation and coordination among
national and WEU movement and transportation
authorities, both military and civilian, economy,
efficisncy, flexibility, operational primacy, simp-
licity and transparency.
37. The principle of subsidiarity will apply
only in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be efficiently achieved by the na-
tions and can therefore be better effected by the
WEU authorities. In that case, the WEU authori-
ties may take action on behalf of nations, subject
to their prior concurrence. The final principle is
that of transport compatibility which holds that
when possible. units with a mobility role should
have equipment designed to be compatible with
available transport resources.
38. ln regard to movement and transportation
policies, WEU and national representatives are
responsible for the development of policies, for
the movement and transportation of forces. M&T
planning to support military operations should be
carried out and coordinated on a combined serv-
ice and joint military/civil basis encompassing all
modes of transport. Separate planning for mari-
time, land and air components of force packages
should be avoided.
39. Nations are responsible for providing suf-
ficient movement and transportation resources
for the deployment, resupply and redeployment
of their forces. M&T plaruring and execution
should be supported by standardised and harmo-
nised procedures.
40. The WEU Operation Commander will de-
velop the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and, through
the WEU Movement Coordination Centre
(WMCC) the WEU Force Commander rvill be
kept informed by the OHQ WMCC) on the pro-
gress ofthe deployment of forces.
41. Finally, generic and contingency move-
ment and transportation planning will place em-
phasis on capability planning. Operational M&T
planning will be developed from contingency
plans.
42. As far as movement and transportation
structure is concerned, there is a permanent
structure, the WEU Mobility Working Group
(WMWG), chaired by the Plamring Cell and
composed of M&T experts from all WEU na-
tions. There are also structures to be activated
for a given WEU operation as follows (see Ap-
pendix I):
WEU Movement Coordination Group
(WMCG): this will be established at
the Planning Cell (WEU/PC) to assist
the PC under the direction of the Chief
of the Logisticsffinance and Move-
ments Section. Its main task will be to
coordinate preparations for the force
deployment options until this function
is taken over by the WMCC.
WEU Movement Coordination Centre
(WMCC): the WMCC will be estab-
lished at the OHQ (Operation Head-
quarters) to perform the tasks of coor-
dination, prioritisation and deconflic-
tion of movements in accordance with
operational requirements. The Centre
will be chaired by a suitably experi-
enced M&T officer and composed of
national M&T experts and have Plan-
ning Cell representation.
National Movement Coordination
Centre (NMCC): host nations should
establish a NMCC to approve, coordi-
nate and control air. sea and inland sur-
face movements within their territory,
in support of the operation. The FHQ
and the nations involved should provide
representation within the NMCC to en-
sure that all movements are executed in
accordance with national requirements
and the Commanders' operational re-
quirements.
National Support Element (NSE): a
NSE is a national organisation posi-
tioned in theatre when required by a
nation. The NSE will support- inter
alia, reception, onward movement,
transportation for sustainment and re-
deployrnent of national forces.
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43. M&T planning begins with a consultation
phase. As the force data becomes known there
will be a second phase, the planning phase. A
third and final phase, the executive phase, com-
mences once the Operation Commander is en-
trusted with the responsibility of conducting the
operation. The WMCC r,vill then be activated at
the OHQ to provide centralised coordination.
44. Tasks and responsibilities are shared be-
tween those involved as follows:
sending nations take the necessary
measures for planning and controlling
the deployrnent, resupply and rede-
ployment of their forces and national
components of multinational forces to
meet the requirements of the Operation
Commander, coordinated in the
WMCC. They are responsible for pro-
viding M&T resources for the deploy-
ment of their own forces and operate
and control national military and civil
M&T resources made available for
shared or cooperative use. They also
agree to broad modalities of coopera-
tion, by selecting nations to take the
lead in performing tasks identified by
the WMCG or WMCC;
non-sending nations may offer M&T
resources for shared or cooperative use
and operate and control national mili-
tary and civil M&T resources made
available for shared or cooperative use:
host nations establish, lvhen required, a
NMCC to approve, coordinate and
control movements of the components
of the WEU force on their own territo-
ries, taking into account the WEU
commander's operational requirements.
They operate and control their own na-
tional civil and military movement and
transportation resources provided at the
request of the sending nations and ar-
range and coordinate border crossing
procedures with neighbouring nations;
lead nations take the lead in planning
and controlling deployment, resupply
and redeployment of a multinational
HQ group (including the Force HQ),
performing host nations' tasks and re-
sponsibilities when required and per-
forming specific movement and
transportation tasks as identified by the
WMCC;
the WEU Planning Cell in general
monitors and takes initiatives for the
development of policies and procedures
in the field of strategic mobility. It also
develops M&T annexes of generic
plans, consulting nations if necessary.
In the event of crises, following Coun-
cil guidance, it produces the first draft
M&T annex for the contingency plan,
consults with nations, takes the initia-
tive to form and chair the WMCG and
drafts the final annex of the contin-
gency plan;
WEU Mobility Working Group
(WNMG) develops policies, proce-
dures and organisations for the move-
ment and transportation of forces in
support of WEU operations;
the WEU Movement Coordination
Group (WMCG) analyses the national
replies to gauge the likely M&T re-
quirements against contingency op-
tions, develops M&T tasks and re-
sponsibilities for the Component Com-
manders and./or interfaces with other
organisations and initiates and coordi-
nates preparation for Contingency
Force deployment until this function is
taken over by the WMCC;
the WEU Operation Commander ex-
ercises coordinating authority thrqugh
the WEU Movement Coordination
Centre (WMCC), develops all the op-
erational requirements for planning and
execution of the deployment. resupply
and redeployment;
WEU Movement Coordination Centre
(WMCC) serves as the primary M&T
point of contact for nations and the Op-
eration Commander and draws up the
M&T annex of the operation plan,
which will be submitted to the Council
for approval. It develops M&T tasks
and responsibilities for the Component
Commanders and performs the tasks of
coordination, prioritisation and decon-
fliction of movements, in accordance
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with operational requirements. It pri-
oritises and coordinates the integrated
use of movements and transportation,
identifies and coordinates lead nation
functions lvithin the field of movements
and transportation and draws up the
redeployment plan;
- 
the WEU Force Commander imple-
ments policies, tasks, responsibilities
and procedures for movements associ-
ated with the employment of the forces;
develops M&T plans as applicable to
WEU force employment tasks; advises
OHQ of required changes concerning
force deplo5rment, resupply and rede-
ployment and provides representation
inthe NMCC(s).
45. Lastly, in terms of ADP (Automated Data
Processing) support, communications and report-
ing, the document notes that WEU mobiltty plan-
ners must be able to develop proposed options,
create detailed plans, test the feasibility of these
plans and execute them. Secure and interoperable
communications and ADP facilities must be
provided to enable appropriate planning, control
and coordination to be carried out. The document
further points out that the WEU Movement Co-
ordination Group and nations and the WEU
Movement Coordination Centre must utilise a
cornmon ADP support system. Standardised re-
porting procedures must apply.
"A joint logistic support concept for
the Western European Union"
46. The introduction to the above paper re-
capitulates the kinds of missions for which armed
forces units of the WEU member states might be
used under the aegis of WEU (Petersberg mis-
sions) and makes reference to a list of FAWEU
(forces answerable to WEU) compiled and up-
dated by the Planning Cell, which will be used
for generic and contingency planning purposes.
The Planning Cell, it explains, is also responsible
for developing logistical plans to identifu early
and address specific logistic requirements to be
taken into account in the WEU force-generation
process thus ensuring an adequate logistical
posture.
47. Because of the ad hoc nattre of WEU op-
erations, different force packages are required.
These will no longer necessarily be coalitions of
national forces that only operate together in the
course of an operation plan. WEU operations
will on the contrary require the integration of
such forces at a much lower level than hitherto
experienced.
48. Operations have to be based on flexible
and responsive mobile forces in order to respond
to local crises and regional conflicts. Fundamen-
tal features of the WEU strategy must be flexi-
bility, mobility, self-sustainment of operational
units and sustainability over long distances.
Hence its logistics support must be tailored to
permit prolonged operations over long distances.
Therefore, the introduction concludes, it is neces-
sary to develop "appropriate logistic principles,
policies and concepts to meet the specific re-
quirements of integrated multinational WEU
force packages".
49. The document then moves on to address:
(a) factors affecting logistic support;
@ logistic principles and policies;
(c) the structure, planning process, tasks
and responsibilities which define the WEU
logistic concept.
50. Factors affecting WEU logistic support
fall into two categories: general and those arising
from WEU's method of operating. Regarding the
first category, all WEU operations will, by
definition, be combined but not necessarily all
WEU nations will provide forces for a particular
operation. WEU operations may occur anyt'here
in the world. Operations may last for protracted
periods. The degree of standardisation of equip-
ment and procedures is relatively low.
51. Moreover, the availability of some military
and civil resources in WEU nations may be lim-
ited and there may be competition for local re-
sources. Logistic support also depends on the
capability and willingness of host nation(s) to
support the WEU force and the availability of
local resources.
52. Lastly, there is a need to comply with na-
tional and EU legislation and international
law/regulations as well as existing host nation(s)
military and civil regulations, covering for ex-
ample, technical support, use of infrastructure
and dangerous goods. There is a need also to
consider the impact of restrictions arising from
in-theatre security conditions.
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53. Worthy of note among the factors arising
from the WEU method of operating are that
WEU operations are likely to be ad hoc ln na-
ture; there are no command structures perma-
nently under the authority of WEU and there may
be a protracted lead time in forces generation, be-
cause FAWEU are not permanently assigned.
54. The primary logistics principle is that na-
tions and the WEU authorities have a collective
responsibility for logistic support of WEU op-
erations. Specific responsibilities are assigned as
follows:
national responsibility: the responsi-
bility for the provision of logistic re-
sources, and for planning the support
of national forces, lies ultimately with
the nation;
WEU responsibility: the WEU Plan-
ning Cell and WEU commanders are
responsible for planning and coordinat-
ing the logistic support to the WEU
force;
lead nation and/or specialist nation re-
sponsibility: the provision of specific
logistic functions may be assumed by
one or more nations, if appropriate.
55. The second logistics principle is connected
with authority. The WEU Operation Commander
must be given sufficient authority over logistic
resources, in a timely mtulner, in order to enable
him to employ and sustain his forces in the most
efficient manner. It has to be clearly defined as
early as possible during the planning process.
56. Other essential logistics principles include:
cooperation between military and civilian auth-
orities in WEU nations and coordination of
logistic support between national and WEU auth-
orities; also, that logistic support must be as
cost-effective as possible with optimal use of
military and civilian resources. There must be
flexibility in the planning and execution of
logistic support to allow for timely response to
changes in the operational situation and readiness
and availability of logistics units.
57. Standardisation of materiel, services and
procedures has a direct impact on sustainability
and combat effectiveness and the document
therefore stresses that "this aim should be pur-
sued with vigour". Subsidiarity applies only in so
far as the objectives ofthe proposed action can-
not be efficiently achieved by the nations and can
therefore be better effected by the WEU authori-
ties. Transparency, in other words information
exchange of relevant logistics data, between na-
tional and WEU authorities is essential for the
efficient support of WEU logistics tasks.
58. According to the document, logistics poli-
cies likewise fall into a number categories:
General policy: generic and contin-
gency logistic planning will put em-
phasis on capability planning. Opera-
tional logistic planning will be devel-
oped from contingency plans and these
will be carried out and coordinated on a
joint civiymilitary basis, where appro-
priate.
Logistic resources policy: nations re-
tain control over their own resources,
until these are released to the WEU
.commander. Nations must take appro-
priate measures to ensure that they
have sufficient logistic resources to
support their forces. They will enter
into bilateral or multilateral agreements
for resource sharing.
The logistic resources suitable and eli-
gible for multinational provision are
identified in the logistic planning pro-
cess. Coordination of the strategic de-
ployment ofWEU forces, as well as the
coordination of movement and trans-
portation of resupply for both cornmon
and specific resources, are a WEU Op-
eration Commander's responsibility.
Host nation support policy: fi:Jl advan-
tage should be taken of logistic re-
sources available under host nation
support arrangements/agreements. If
such arrangements/agreements do not
already exist, the Operation Comman-
der is responsible for establishing
requirements and concluding host na-
tion support arrangements/agreements
on behalf of sending nations subject to
their prior concurrence.
Logistic sustainability policy: nations
are responsible for meeting the sustain-
ability requirements. The provision of
logistic assets must cover the antici-
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pated intensity and duration ofthe op-
eration. The question of rotating units
and their associated logistics must also
be raised. Operating in unusual and ad-
verse conditions can cause increased
wear and tear, and may require the
provision of additional resources. A
sustainability statement, agreed at the
earliest stage by contributing nations,
lvill enhance uniformity among the na-
tional contingents. Such a statement
should cover the following:
(i) expected duration of the whole de-
ployment or operation;
(iy' minimum level of sustainability:
(iii) any special operational, clima-
tological or topographical factors that
may restrict or significantly influence
logistic planning;
(iv) predicted casualty and material
usage rates.
Redistribution policy: this is an excep-
tional crisis-management tool, not to be
used as a routine procedure. Redistri-
bution may in no case jeopardise the
survivability of the providing unit. It
will last only until the deficiency situa-
tion is resolved.
- 
Medical support policy: routine care
will be a national responsibility. Medi-
cal support functions, that might be
suitable for lead nation responsibility,
role specialisation of a nation or multi-
national integrated medical support
must be identified in the planning pro-
cess. These usually encompass major
surgical interventions, emergency sur-
gery and surgery to prevent potentially
disabling complications.
- 
Movement policy: definitions of poli-
cies, tasks and responsibilities involved
under this heading have already been
defined in the WEU Strategic Mobility
Concept examined earlier.
59. In relation to command and control, the
document notes that since there is no permanent
WEU command structure, command and control
arrangements will be decided by the WEU
Council once the operation is determined. Two
main levels of command can be defined as des-
cribed belolv:
60. Operarional level: here an Operation
Commander will be appointed by the WEU
Council. His headquarters will be joint and com-
bined as far as required and located outside the
theatre of operations. The Operation Commander
will be responsible for the overall planning and
conduct of the operation.
61. In theatre: a Force Commander, desig-
nated by the WEU Council, will exercise com-
mand in the theatre of operations. His headquar-
ters will be joint and combined as far as required.
Additionally, nations will retain full command
over their forces and the level of authority (e.g.
operational command/control) given to WEU
commanders will be decided by the Council for
each specific operation.
62. Once the Council has agreed to the opera-
tion plan, it will determine the procedures for
transfer of authority (TOA). Based on these, in-
dividual nations will consider TOA and place
their units under operational command/control of
the Operation Commander. Nations which agree
to commiffing logistic units to perform multina-
tional logistic support will normally place these
units under the operational command./control of
the WEU Operation Commander.
63. In terms of logistic structure the document
makes a distinction between permanent struc-
tures, structures normally activated for any WEU
operation, and other (optional) structures that
might be activated for a given WEU operation
(see Appendix II).
64. Permanent structures include the Western
European Logistics Group (WELG), composed
of logistic experts from WEU nations and man-
dated to foster closer cooperation and to promote
greater efficiency and harmonisation in logistics.
In the event of a possible operation, and pending
the nomination of the Operation Commander, the
Planning Cell's Logistics Section develops the
annexes for logisic support, movement and
transportation, medical support, civiVmilitary co-
operation (CIMIC) and finance of the contin-
gency plan.
65. The structures normally activated for a
WEU operation are as follows:
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WEU Logistics Coordination Group
(WLCG). The WLCG will be estab-
lished at the WEU/PC to assist the PC
with logistic planning and to coordinate
preparations for the Contingency Force
deployrnent options until this function
is taken over by the WLCC;
Operation Commander Logistics Staff
Cell. Once the Operation Commander
is appointed, a logistics staff cell will
be activated under his authority;
WEU Logistics Coordination Centre
(W'LCC). The WLCC. which replaces
the WLCG, will be established at the
OHQ;
Force Commander Logistics Staff Cell.
Once the Force Commander is ap-
pointed. a multinational logistics staff
cell will be activated under his author-
itv;
Force Logistic Coordination Centre
(FLCC). An FLCC, composed of rep-
resentatives from nations and other or-
ganisations will be activated only when
a MJLC is not established;
National Support Element (NSE). A
NSE is a national organisation posi-
tioned in theatre when required by a
nation. The NSE will support the re-
ception, storage, onward movement,
transportation for sustainment and re-
deployment of national forces.
66. Optional structures that might be activated
for a given WEU operation are the Multinational
Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC/ which, if re-
quired, will coordinate in-theatre logistics and the
Multinational Integrated Logistics Support Units
(MILUs). MILUs may be formed as necessary
and placed under operational control (OPCON)
of the WEU Force Commander.
67. The logistic support planmng process can
be divided into four sequential and functional
phases: crisis build-up, leading to the develop-
ment of a cofllmon position, including possible
action; definition of action; formal decision to
take action and politico-military control of the
operation.
68. During the "crisis build-up", the logistic
planning will commence with a "consultation
phase" which will involve planning conferences
between the WEU Planning Cell and nations.
During the "definition of action", the WEU Lo-
gistics Coordination Group $lfLCG) will be acti-
vated by the WEU Planning Cell. As the force
data becomes available from the replies on the
Declaration of lntent Request (DIR) message, the
logistic "Planning Phase" will start. The WLCG
and the Planning Cell ensure that the needs ex-
pressed in the Contingency Plan are aligned with
the intentions of each nation.
69. After the "decision to take action", the
logistic ''executive phase" will commence once
the Operation Commander is appointed. The
WLCC (see Appendix II) will produce the Logis-
tics Annex of the Operation Plan, based on the
replies of the Force Creation Request Message
(FCRM). Once the Council has agreed to the
Operation Plan it will determine the procedures
for TOA and the Force Assembly Message
(FAM) is sent. This message will identify the
force composition. Individual nations will con-
sider placing their units under Operational Com-
mand/Control of the Operation Commander.
During the "politico-military control" phase, the
coordination of national and multinational logis-
tic support will be initiated by the FHQ or
MJLC. if required.
70. The section dealing lvith tasks and re-
sponsibilities explains how sending nations take
the necessary measures for planning and control-
ling the logisic support of their forces, and na-
tional components of multinational forces. They
are responsible for providing logistic resources
for the support of their own forces, they identifr
available national logistic resources for coopera-
tive use to meet identified shortfalls in other
sending nations' logistics plans; operate and con-
trol national military and civil logistic resources
for the operation and agree to cooperative ar-
rangements by identifuing nations to take the lead
in performing specific tasks.
71. Nations not committing forces to the op-
eration (non-sending nations) may offer support,
assets and/or funding for the operation. Host na-
tions provide host nation support (FNS) on a
bilateral or multilateral basis.
72. Lead nations take the responsibility inter
alia for providing a defined spectrum of logistic
support for all or part of the multinational force;
take the lead in performing host nation tasks and
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responsibilities, when authorised by the host
nation, and take the lead in performing specific
tasks as identified by WLCC. Role specialist
nations take responsibility for procuring and pro-
viding a particular class of supply or service.
73. The WEU Planning Cell's tasks and re-
sponsibilities are generally to monitor and take
initiatives for the development of policies and
procedures in the field of logistic support and
develop logistic annexes of generic plans. In
times of crisis the PC updates logistic parts of
generic plans, takes the initiative to form and
chair the WLCG and drafts, with the assistance
of national representatives, the logistic parts of
the final contingency plan.
74. The Western European Logistics Group
(WELG) contributes to the formulation of proce-
dures that will ensure the operational logistic
support of any WEU force and improves interop-
erability and standardisation in the field of logis-
tic support. The WEU Logistic Coordination
Group, for its part, analyses the national replies
to the Declaration of lntent Request message to
assess the likely logistic requirements against
contingency options and assists in drafting the
logistic inputs to the final contingency plan.
75. The WEU Operation Commander is re-
sponsible for both the planning and coordination
of the deployment, support and recovery of the
WEU force. At TOA the Operational Com-
mander is responsible for the coordination of
non-organic logistics resources, including medi-
cal. He develops all the operational requirements
for planning and execution of sustainment and
resupply.
76. The WEU Logisics Coordination Centre
(WLCC) seryes as the primary logistics point of
contact for nations and the Operation Com-
mander and assists the Operation Commander in
drafting the logistic input to the operation plan,
which will be submitted to the Council for ap-
proval. The WLCC also coordinates, prioritises
and deconflicts national and multinational sus-
tainment and resupply issues, in accordance with
operational requirernents.
77. The WEU Force Commander develops
logistics plans as applicable to WEU force em-
ployment tasks; coordinates the activities of the
NSEs (national support elements), whenever
multinational issues arise; coordinates all aspects
of multinational logistic sustainment in the
theatre of operations; implements policies, tasks,
responsibilities and procedures for movements
associated with the employment of the forces and
controls multinational integrated logistic support.
78. The Force Logistics Coordination Centre
serves as an in-theatre point of contact for coor-
dination and deconflliction of logistics in accor-
dance with operational requirements. The Multi-
national Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) is typi-
cally responsible for assisting the Force Com-
mander in coordinating logistic support rvithin
the task force, establishing host nation support
requirements, where appropriate, coordinating
and arranging the provision of common supplies
and services and coordinating and administra-
tively supporting national, NGO and host nation
liaison staffs withinthe MJLC.
79. The Multinational Integrated Logistic Sup-
port Unit (MILU) acquires the agreed supplies
and/or services and provides supplies and ser-
vices to the WEU force.
80. As regards communications, the document
notes that communication links must be dedicated
to the logistic C2 structure, including automated
logistics and administration information system.
As regards financial affairs, the report explains
that WEU has developed preliminary conclusions
and transitional arrangements for the financing of
WEU operations.
81. With reference to legal affairs, a status of
forces agreement will be negotiated between
WEU, the sending and host nation(s). Deploy-
ment of forces prior to a formal status of forces
agreement (SFA) will be made on a case by case
basis. Forces will remain subject to the jurisdic-
tion of their national military procedures. Lastly,
a WEU policy on environmental affairs will be
developed in due course.
IV The Assembly's worh in the area
of strategic mobility
82. The general philosophy behind the Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee's reports
down the years can be summed up in a single
sentence: pooling shared resources. This logically
includes using joint structures and also presup-
poses a lengthy process of cooperation and
alignment of procedures and standardisation of
equipment betwesn nations.
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83. The present section refers to reports in
which the fusembly studied various aspects that
are essential for acquiring a genuine European
strategic mobility capability.
"A command and control systemfor l,yEa"
84. From a military view-point, in order to
bring together military resources belonging to
different nations, the first requirement is a com-
mand structure, in other words an operation
command and control system capable of prepar-
ing, coordinating and controlling such operations.
85. Mr Cunliffe's report to the Assembly on
"A command and control system for WEU"2 ar-
gues that in order to conduct operations under its
own aegis, WEU requires a communication and
information system (CIS) for command and con-
trol, based on its member countries' assets. The
report also stresses that WEU should not only be
able to rely on having the use of such a system
but that it should also be under WEU control.
86. In his report Mr Cunliffe points out that
CIS systems carry out tasks on three levels,
namely at:
strategic level (the politico-military in-
terface) at which CIS have an input
into evaluating the world situation, cri-
sis monitoring and the planning of
possible military operations;
operational level (coordination of
combined joint military operations).
Here CIS should offer the means of
monitoring and integration of military
operations and issuing orders.
tactical level (coordination of military
operations lvithin a theatre). At this
level CIS should provide the means of
command and control over operational
support units on the ground.
87. ln view of the above, the Rapporteur
stressed that WEU should seek to reinforce the
roles that no individual nation can take on by
itself. In this contexl, WEU should operate at the
strategic and operational levels while tactical
tasks would be carried out by nations, possibly
under the responsibility of a framework nation.
88. The document moreover explains in a
straightfonruard and graphic way the functions,
means and possible development of a WEU CIS
in the command and control of operations at the
various stages of situation evaluation, planning
and command and control of operations. Without
its own CIS, the Rapporteur concludes, the Or-
ganisation would be incapable of undertaking
such missions :N may be required.
89. As far as intelligence is concerned, in ad-
dition to the Assembly documents which have
looked at the setting up of a European space-
based observation system, the WEU Satellite
Centre or a European intelligence policy, Mr
Cunliffe's report recommends that in terms of
situation evaluation requirements the lntelligence
Section of the Planning Cell should draw up an
intelligence plan at European level to identifu
areas of potential crisis, so that national re-
sources and the tasks of the Satellite Centre can
be used to better effect.
90. Finally, Mr Cunliffe also makes the point
that WEU's aim should not be to create a intelli-
gence superstructure to take the place of national
services but to increase their effectiveness, by
pooling shared intelligence.
"Military airlifi 
- 
prospectsfor Europe"
91. The report on this subject submitted by Mr
Alexander3 looked in some depth at how,
basically by considerably reducing the time
factor in any journey, aviation has become an
indispensable tool in managing crises in ilre
modern world. For both combat (including
helicopters) or transport aircra.ft, reaction time is
virtually immediate as compared with other land
and sea transport means. To give but one
example 
- 
during the Yom Kippur war in 1973,
ttre United States launched a major operation to
provide logistical support to Israel. 26%o of the
equipment was dispatched by air and arrived in
good time, while the remaining 74% dispatched
by sea arrived after the end of the hostilitiesa.
92. However airlift also has limitations, espe-
cially in terms of the loads it can carry, but it has
to be recognised all the same that the use of air-
3 Assembly Document 1484,6 November 1995.
o Airlift Conference in London, 31 August-l Sep-
tember 1995: some thoughts on the development of
military air transport l918-1995.2 Assembly Document 1621,5 November 199E.
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lift has made a decisive impact on crisis man-
agement.
93. Military airlift today has many dimensions
corresponding to the tasks to be carried out and
the means used. These mainly consist of military
and humanitarian support missions.
94. Whether for transporting personnel or
equipment, airlift has the advantage of speed and
time-saving and also the possibihry of reaching
areas that are inaccessible by land or sea. From
ttre major airlift operations of the second world
war to the Gulf war, the use of airlift has proved
essential. Several recent examples: the Falklands
war (1982), the crisis in the Gulf and the Gulf
war (1990-91). the more recent crisis in Iraq
(199E) and nor,v the conflict in Kosovo serve to
illustrate the importance of airlift and forces pro-
jection in recent years.
95. Moreover, from the humanitarian angle,
from the time of the Berlin airlift in 1948, trans-
port aircraft have always played an important
role in bringing aid to populations in distress,
covering large distances to out of the way areas
in a short space of time. In the 1980s this role
increased and European countries acquired major
expertise in operations of this type by undertak-
ing them on several continents, sometimes under
very difficult conditions.
96. The Rlvandan crisis led to a major mobil-
isation of military airlift capability. Belgium and
France committed aircraft for both military and
humanitarian purposes. British, Spanish and
other aircraft afforded assistance to populations
in distress. Such operations also served to bring
to light European countries' shortage of airlift
capacity, leading some countries to charter An-
tonov and Ilyushin aircraft, mainly from Ukraine.
97. The Bosnian conflict, because of its mili-
tary and above all its humanitarian dimensions,
gave rise to the longest airlift operation in history
since the Berlin airlift in 194849. Over three
years, aircraft belonging to more than 20 coun-
tries transported more than 100 000 tonnes of
humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, often under ex-
tremely difficult conditions, with some aircraft
being hit by fire from the various factions on the
ground.
98. In order to carry out this humanitarian
operation successfully, the Air Transport Opera-
tions Cell was created n 1992 under UNHCR
(United Nations High Commission for Refugees)
management, in order to ensure that aid reached
the population of Sarajevo, under siege from
Bosnian Serb forces. The Cell is based in Ge-
neva.
99. Experience acquired in many regions of
the world, under varl.ing conditions, combining
rigorous planning and improvisation, shows the
high level of expertise achieved by European
countries in the conduct of military airlift opera-
tions, and undoubtedly contributes to ensuring
their state of readiness to intervene quickly in
crisis situations, despite the limited mea:rs avail-
able to their airforces, as compared with the
possibilities of countries such as the United
States or Russia.
100. The report by Mr Alexander draws the
distinction made in terms of military aviation
assets between strategic and tactical lift. The first
refers to aircraft with an intercontinental range
over 3 000 nautical miles (5 600 km) rvhile the
second refers to tactical or in-theatre capability.
l0l . Strategic lift is still virtually the monopoly
of the United States, Russia and one or two other
countries of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Europe
will have to wait for the advent of what was oncb
known as the FLA (Future Large Aircraft) in
order to have such capabilities. However, when it
comes to tactical lift it has a great deal of know-
how, both through cooperative ventures and na-
tional programmes.
102. In his report, Mr Alexander also reviews
current military airlift programmes and discusses
the challenges they represent and their implica-
tions for Europe. The FLA is of particular sig-
nificance. [t is not a matter, for Europe, of a
purely military option. There are also important
political, industrial- economic and social consid-
erations involved.
103. For the countries participating in the FLA
prografirme 
- 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, Spairr, Turkey and the United Kingdom
- 
the interest lies not only in replacing the airlift
fleet but also in enabling the European aeronau-
tics industry to maintain its world ranking, in the
same way as was achieved with the civilian Air-
bus programme. This is also an important step
tolvards providing European armies with in-
creased projection capability, which is lacking at
16
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present, and ensuring their independence from the
United States and other sources.
104. Launched in 1985, in the framework of ttre
lndependent European Programme Group
(IEPG), now the Western European Armaments
Group (WEAG), the former FLA programme has
been affected by the vicissitudes ofthe debate on
European defence. It has now been re-christened
the A400M. In late January of this year an
Airbus spokesman announced that the FLA was
dead but that the programme itself lvas alive and
well under the guise of the A400M programme.
105. Airbus Military, Airbus's recently formed
subsidiary, will, according to a report by Jane's
Defense Weekly, take over production of the new
military airlifter lvhich is to have its production
line in Spains. tt should become clear within the
year what orders will be forthcoming from gov-
ernments and the product can then be well and
truly launched.
106. According to estimates, the maiden flight
should take place four years after the programme
is definitely under way. Delivery will be towards
late 2005 or early 2006 and the cost will be in
the region of US$ 75 million.
107. Seven European govemments have shown
an interest in 288 aircraft. Four of them, Bel-
gium, France, Spain and the UK are evaluating
other options such as the Boeing C-17 and the
Lockheed Martin C-I30J. Moreover, Russia and
Ukraine have also offered a "lvesternised" ver-
sion of their jointly developed Antonov An-70 to
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, following
continued interest on Germany's part.
108. There is no doubt that the decision coun-
tries will take on this matter is of major impor-
tance in military, political and industrial terms.
Up until now, the prograrnme has fallen within
the scope of a common defence industrial policy,
making it a flagship programme in which any
delay would have serious consequences for the
development of a European arrnaments policy.
From an industrial angle, any decision not to
continue with the programme would prevent
European industry acquiring technological edge
and becoming competitive in a difficult economic
environment, marked by ever-falling defence
budgets.
"European cooperotion on the procurement
of defence eqaipment"
109. Armaments cooperation is an abiding pre-
occupation in the work of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee, a fact amply demon-
strated by the colloquy held in Munich in Oct-
ober 1997 and Mr Lenzer's subsequent report on
"European cooperation on the procurement of
defence equipment"6.
110. The report makes the point that security
and defence in Europe must be founded on auto-
nomous military assets rvhich are interoperable
with those of our transatlantic allies. Such assets
in turn depend on having a European defence
industry which is competitive on the intemational
market.
I I l. In the post-cold war period when defence
budgets declined or showed little significant
grollth, markets shrank, competition became
keener and the costs of new lveapons systems
rose exponentially due to technological develop-
ment.
ll2. Europe faced these challenges lvith an in-
dustry that was fragmented and suffered from
overcapacity. These shortcomings lvere mainly
due to the fact that every country persisted in
maintaining as much independent national capa-
city as possible rvhile its own domestic market
was clearly not sufficiently developed to absorb
all the investment being poured into R&D and
industrialisation 
- 
a situation that was the reverse
of that in the United States. All this confirms the
view that a European defence industry that is
competitive on world markets has to have a
European market as its bedrock. The European
defence industry must engage in a process of
restructuring at both national and European
levels. That process, the culmination of which is
the setting-up of transnational industries, has al-
ready today reached an advanced stage and a
number of countries, such as France, Italy and
Spain, have embarked on the preliminary phase
oftotal or partial privatisation of certain defence
concerns in the state sector,
I13. Harmonising requirements at European
level is particularly important. The only way to
overcome the difficulties encountered in harm-
onising requirements is for the harmonisation
t JDW, vol 31. 3 February 1999, No. 5.
l7
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process to start as of the research stage. This is
what makes the Euclid programme (European
cooperation for the long term in defence) and the
WEAG Euclid Cell so crucial. The benefits of
tlose extremely useful initiatives are indeed al-
ready being felt.
I14. The creation of the Western European
Armaments Organisation (WEAO) and of the
Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation
(OCCAR) are initiatives to be welcomed. Simi-
larly the creation in May 1997 of the WEU
Military Committee is of crucial importance as it
will provide the proper frame for defining the
joint European military requirements ttrat need to
be met 
- 
in particular, the joint procurement and
use of equipment.
115. Lastly, your Rapporteur considers the re-
ports reviewed above give an idea of the Assem-
bly's work in connection lvith WEU's acquiring
a real strategic mobilrty capability and further-
more show that that capability is not simply a
question of assets, personnel and equipment but
also, indeed mainly- of political will, as discussed
in the following chapter.
11 Conclusions
116. Under the current German Presidency,
WEU decided to carry out an audit of assets
available to it for use in European operations.
This audit will alrnost certainly highlight the fact
that strategic mobility is an Achilles heel of
European defence. In point of fact, not even the
United States is self-sufficient in this area
although European and United States short-
comings bear no comparison 
- 
those of Europe
being infinitely the greater.
ll7. Of the three transport options that exist:
air, land and sea, overland means are in principle
of least interest since they camot compare with
air for speed or with water-borne means in terms
of capacity. Some armed forces complain that
specific rail-links, regarded as strategic from a
military viewpoint, have been closed to traffic
because they are not economically viable. Lack
of maintenance of the track and installations have
rapidly rendered them unusable.
I18. The operations in which Europe has taken
part in recent years have made almost exclusive
use of air and sea lift. One such operation, the
Gulf War, highlighted the fact that even the
United States lacked this form of strategic mo-
bility capability to transport troops and equip-
ment. At that juncture, the United States mobi-
lised 450 000 troops. The most Europe could
mobilise at present would be 30 000.
l19. If mobilrty is considered on a continental
scale, the deficiencies are obvious as several re-
cent examples go to show. During the conflict in
former Yugoslavia many countries used civilian
transport fty sea) to carry troops and equipment.
Furthermore Europe has no airlift capability for
transporting tanks. Viewed on an intercontinental
scale, for instance the African Great Lakes crisis,
the situation is even worse.
120. Agreements have been reached with
Ukraine on strategic lift and a draft agreement is
being negotiated lvith Russia, as referred to earl-
ier in this report. But one must not forget that in
such cases, it would be those countries that
lvould invariably hold the key to such coopera-
tive ventures getting offthe ground.
l2l. The lack of transport means also leads to
somewhat anomalous situations which in practice
occur in almost every country. Each branch of
the armed services 
- 
arny, nayy or air force 
-
when faced with a budget that is never enough to
cover its requirements, establishes its own pri-
orities, leading, for example, to a situation in
which the navy procures the ships it needs to
transport its own troops and equipment. The
army then also has to procure its own ships to
transport its troops and equipment. ln short, each
service takes account only of its own needs
without there being a single underlying philos-
ophy capable of matching needs and resources
across the three seryices.
122. Studies show that, where time permits,
transport by sea quickly becomes the most cost-
effective way of transporting troops and equip-
ment to the theatre of operations. For example,
most of the troops deployed in Bosnia and Alba-
nia were taken there by sea and this was also the
case in the Gulf war. One difficulty is finding
commercial cargo vessels suitable for trans-
poning military equipment 
- 
the number of roll
on/roll off ferries and freighters in circulation
being fairly limited. Thus all WEU mernber
states need to monitor t]te construction of such
vessels in their own yards and make sure they are
suitable for transporting heavy vehicles, espe-
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cially tanks. Governments should even be en-
couraged to fund adaptations of original designs
for this type of shipping so as to give it that
capacity.
123. As suffrcient military strategic mobility
capability does not exist at present, nor will in
the future. it will be necessary to have recourse
to the civilian sectors. Each country will have to
reach internal agreements on the use of civil
means with airlines, shipping companies and the
railways. The fact that not all countries have an
internal agreement on the use of such means is
another problem. Before NATO's recent en-
largement, five of its sixteen members had no
such agreement.
124. The use of civilian transport and personnel
poses problems. For example, staff refuse to
serve in war zones. The lray round this could be
to use reserves. The United States does in fact
use reserves in its airlift command.
125. When it comes to forces projection, the
question arises as to lvhether there might be a
point in establishing a joint fleet. Once again the
A400M programme, the successor to the erst-
while FLA, comes to mind. This programme is of
paramount interest as it falls r,vithin the frame-
work of a common defence industrial policy and,
as such, should be supported and carried forward
more actively by WEU. Without such longer-
term policies there will be no credible European
defence enabling us to assert and protect our
interests in the world.
126. Furthermore, strategic mobilrty goes hand
in hand with equipment standardisation and inter-
operability. This, contrary to what some might
wish, does not mean procurement in one particu-
lar country. As an example of the difficulties
involved, one can point to the fact that it does not
even exist between the US Navy and the US Air-
force. Common equipment, education and train-
ing and logistics are key factors for strategic
mobility.
127. With regard to setting up the organisa-
tional structures within WEU necessary for
achieving a real strategic mobility capability,
your Rapporteur feels that WEU must create
permanent structures within the Organisation:
specifically a system of operational command
and control (CIS) and logistics structures. One
view expressed during the preparation ofthe pre-
sent report is worthy of careful consideration,
namely that overlap and duplication are not the
same thing; setting up a secondary system is not
the same as duplication 
- 
it is simply a security
guarantee.
128. Lastly, WEU's problems when it comes to
establishing a programme for strategic mobility
are no more than the sum total of those of each
and every one of its component nations. No solu-
tion can be achieved without a prior shake-up of
finances, industry and defence, rvhich can only
take place if there is a strong political will to
build a security and defence Europe.
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